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RECENT DECISIONS 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-CoNVICTION WITHOUT EVIDENCE OF 
GUILT-Petitioner was convicted in the Police Court of Louisville, Kentucky, 
of two offenses. After seeing petitioner "dancing by himself" on the dance 
floor, the police charged him with loitering;1 when he became argumentative 
about this arrest, he was also charged with disorderly conduct.2 Although 
he protested that he had come into the restaurant where he was arrested to 
"wait on a bus" and have a meal, he was nevertheless taken into custody. At 
the trial the arresting officer testified that the manager had told him that 
petitioner had been there "a little over a half hour and that he had not 
bought anything."3 The city offered no other evidence against petitioner 
except a record showing fifty-four previous arrests. The police court sitting 
without a jury found petitioner guilty and fined him ten dollars on each 
charge. Further state review of the case was unavailable.4 On certiorari to 
the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. It is a violation of due 
process of law under the fourteenth amendment to convict a person without 
evidence of his guilt. Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960). 
By basing its decision on a finding of "no evidence whatever ... to sup-
port these convictions,"5 the Court brought into question the scope of 
Supreme Court review of state judicial proceedings, and in particular the 
extent to which state findings of fact will be reviewed.6 It is true that the 
Court has traditionally made an independent examination of so-called "con-
1 LOUISVILLE, KY., ORDINANCES § 85-12 provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person 
••• without visible means of support, or who cannot give a satisfactory account of himself 
... to sleep, lie, loaf, or trespass in or about any premises, building, or other structure in 
the City of Louisville, without first having obtained the consent of the owner or controller 
of said premises, structure, or building .••• " 
2 LOUISVILLE, KY., ORDINANCES § 85-8. 
3 Principal case at 200. The officer's testimony was seriously undermined at the trial 
by the manager•s testimony that he personally had not served the petitioner any food, but 
that a waiter or waitress might have. Principal case at 201 n.3. 
4 Police court fines of less than $20 on a single charge are not subject to appeal or 
review in any other Kentucky court. KY. REv. STAT. § 26.080 (1960). In response to peti-
tioner's request for a stay of the judgment to give him an opportunity to apply for certiorari 
to the Supreme Court, the police court suspended judgment for 24 hours during which 
time petitioner sought a longer stay from the Kentucky circuit court. That court granted 
a stay on the grounds that the petitioner's constitutional claims were "substantial and not 
frivolous," Thompson v. Taustine, No. 40175, Jefferson, Ky., Cir. Ct., 1959. Principal case 
at 203. On appeal by the city the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the circuit court 
lacked the power to grant the stay, but, in an extraordinary step, granted its own stay, even 
though petitioner had not applied to it for a stay. Thus, the Kentucky courts indicated 
their desire that the Supreme Court pass on the constitutional questions raised by the case. 
See principal case at 202, 203. 
5 Principal case at 206. 
6 The opinion of the Court, written by Mr. Justice Black, follows an analysis similar to 
that used in Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957), in which the Court held, three 
Justices dissenting, that it was a denial of due process of law for a committee of bar e.x-
aminers to refuse to certify an applicant for admission to the bar because he had failed to 
prove that he was of good moral character. In Konigsberg, as in the principal case, the 
Court made an independent examination of the sufficiency of evidence to determine whether 
the adjudicating body was justified in reaching the result it did. 
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stitutional facts" where a conclusion of law relating to a federal right and a 
finding of fact are so intermingled that it is necessary to analyze the facts in 
order to pass upon the federal question.7 But to hypothesize that "suf-
ficiency of evidence" is such a constitutional fact is to beg the question by 
assuming the answer to the serious problem raised by the case: "ls sufficiency 
of evidence hereafter to be considered a constitutional fact?" 
The development of a broader scope of review by the Supreme Court of 
state judicial decisionss makes it possible to identify three general areas in 
which the Court will review state findings of fact for alleged due process 
violations. First, the Court will review the facts to make sure that the de-
fendant has not been denied a right so fundamental that it is beyond the 
reach of state police power regulation.0 Here the Court is protecting sub-
stantive rights from state encroachment by means of due process interpreta-
tion. The test of constitutionality, whether the state action can be deemed 
"reasonable," is determined by a balancing of police power interests and 
private rights.1 0 The use of this analysis in the principal case would have 
necessitated elevating "dancing with oneself" to the status of a fundamental 
right, a course the Court was understandably unwilling to follow.11 Second-
ly, the Court will also review the facts in cases in which it is alleged that the 
defendant's trial lacked that degree of fundamental fairness demanded by 
the due process clause.12 Rather than examining the quality or quantity of 
evidence, this approach examines those factors, unrelated to the probative 
value of the evidence, which may serve to vitiate the trial due to the conduct 
7Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385-86 (1927). 
8 See KAUPER, FRONTIERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY (1956); Forkosch, American 
Democracy and Procedural Due Process, 24 BROOKLYN L. REv. 173 (1958). 
9 Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (petitioner deprived of 
fundamental right of free speech by arbitrary application of municipal charter); De Jonge 
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (arbitrary application of criminal syndicalism statute in-
fringed upon right of free speech). See Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and The 
Supreme Court, 40 HARV. L. REv. 943 (1927). 
10 The state police power must be "exerted within the limits of those fundamental 
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institu-
tions ..•. " Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884) (prosecution for felonies by 
information not violative of due process). See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's extensive discus-
sion of the fundamental rights concepts in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (convic-
tion by state after acquittal by federal government held valid). 
11 It may also be surmised that Mr. Justice Black's failure to use a substantive due 
process approach was at least partially motivated by his personal conviction that the only 
substantive rights immunized from the exercise of state police powers are those contained in 
the Bill of Rights and "incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment. He has con-
demned the concept of substantive due process of law as a "natural law formula" and "an 
incongruous excrescence on our Constitution." Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68, 75 
(1947) (dissenting opinion). 
12 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In this case the Court held that the peti• 
tioners were denied due process of law because they were prevented from securing counsel 
of their own choice and were denied a fair hearing by failure of the trial court to provide 
effective assistance of counsel in their behalf. See also Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 
(1923) (threat of violence denies due process); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 
(1947) (denial of counsel to indigent juvenile accused of murder violates due process). 
But see Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
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of the trial or of the police which "shocks the conscience"13 or which violates 
rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."14 This analysis would 
not have been appropriate in the principal case for it has never been in-
timated, and the Court in the principal case did not intimate, that conviction 
without sufficient evidence is sufficiently shocking that it violates due proc-
ess.15 Thirdly, the Court has reviewed evidentiary findings of state courts 
when it is the quality of the evidence which is challenged. Evidence tainted 
by perjury1s or by a coerced confession17 are typical situations in which such 
inquiry has been made. The question in cases of this type is not whether 
there is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, but whether the evidence 
presented is reliable enough to do so. This classification was inapplicable 
because the evidence in the principal case had no such taint. Instead of 
using one of these traditional approaches to the due process question, the 
Court looked to the quantitative aspect of the evidence, and held that the 
amount was insufficient to sustain the conviction.1 s This fact was elevated 
to one of constitutional significance when the Court concluded that the 
petitioner had been denied due process of law.19 
13 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (stomach pumping for evidence of 
dope vitiates trial. Compare with Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (extraction of 
blood from vein does not violate due process). 
14 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (dictum). 
15 Cf. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 605 (1944), in which the Court declared that 
mere error in reaching a jury verdict does not violate due process. Other cases in which 
the Court has stated its view that the Constitution does not guarantee that the decisions of 
state courts shall be free from error include Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948) (erroneous 
interpretation of state law does not deny due process); and Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 
258 (1907) (tax assessment error does not deprive petitioner of property without due 
process). 
Moreover, the Court has not been "shocked" by the admission of evidence in state 
trials procured by unconstitutional searches and seizures, Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 
(1954); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
16 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). The Court said: "The duty of this Court to 
make its own independent examination of the record when federal constitutional depriva• 
tions are alleged is clear, resting, as it does, on our solemn responsibility for maintaining 
the Constitution involate," id. at 271. See also Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957); 
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). 
17 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (use of a confession obtained by physical 
torture denies due process). Cf. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), where the Court 
found no denial of due process despite police tactics which included holding the prisoners 
incommunicado while subjecting them to intermittent questioning over a 32-hour period. 
It was in this case that Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the majority, indicated that the 
fourteenth amendment did not exact a rigid exclusionary rule of evidence but only pro-
tected against conviction on inherently untrustworthy evidence. Cf. Spano v. New York, 
360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959), which indicated that coerced confessions are excluded be-
cause of the basic unfairness in attaining them and not because of their inherent untrust-
worthiness as evidence. 
18 Principal case at 206. Here the Court followed the analysis used in Konigsberg, 
supra note 6, and used in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), in which 
the Court held it to be a denial of due process to deny petitioner's application to take the 
New Mexico bar examination because "[P]ast membership in the Communist Party does 
not justify an inference that he presently has bad moral character." Id. at 246. 
19 It is submitted that the Court could have found a denial of due process without 
"second guessing" the trier of fact. It could have held that the loitering statute, supra 
note I, provided petitioner with inadequate notice that his conduct fell within the statute's 
prohibitory mandates, and therefore that the application of the statute to the petitioner's 
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Review of the quantitative value of the evidence requires the Court to 
determine whether the fact-finder could reasonably infer the ultimate fact 
of guilt from the sum of evidence presented by the state.20 In this respect 
the analysis most closely resembles that used by the Court when reviewing 
convictions based upon statutory presumptions. In the principal case the 
Court reviewed the reasonableness of the inference of guilt from the facts 
proved; in the statutory presumption cases it reviews the rationality of the 
connection benveen the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed.21 The 
parallel is even more apparent, for the decision in the principal case was 
based only on an examination of the uncontroverted evidence, not of con-
tested issues.22 For this reason, it would be unwarranted to conclude that 
the Thompson case signals the intervention by the Supreme Court into the 
process by which the relative weight of evidence is determined.23 It seems 
probable that the Court will confine this case to its facts in light of the 
Court's historical reluctance to intervene in state fact-finding processes, and 
in view of the plethora of peculiar facts in this case-no state appellate review 
available; petitioner's record of previous arrests which may have led the 
Court to suspect harassment; the unspoken equal protection concern because 
the petitioner was a Negro; the uncontested nature of the evidence; the 
judge as the sole trier of facts. If the case is so limited, the chief impact will 
have been identification of problems and weaknesses in state procedures 
which othenvise might have escaped public notice. But if the case portends 
the Supreme Court's willingness to review the sufficiency of uncontroverted 
evidence, the role of the Court in the administration of state criminal justice 
will have been significantly expanded.24 
Donald A. Slichter 
acts was an arbitrary act in violation of due process. See United States v. Brewer, 139 U.S. 
278, 288 (1891) (election procedure statute held not applicable under the facts), in which 
the Court said, "Laws which create crime ought to be so explicit that all men subject to 
their penalties may know what acts it is their duty to avoid. • . • Before a man can be 
punished, his case must be plainly and unmistakably within the statute." See also United 
States v. Lacher, 134 U.S. 624 (1890) (embezzlement statute held applicable to petitioner) 
(dictum). 
20 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, supra note 18, at 246-47. See also Local 10, 
United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192, 197 (1953) (dictum). 
21 Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467, 468 (1943) (presumption of violating Federal 
Firearms Act invalidated); Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929) (presumption of fraud 
from bank insolvency held invalid). See Brosman, The Statutory Presumption, 5 TuL. L. 
REv. 17 and 178 (1930). 
22 The only disputed fact was whether petiuoner had purchased anything to eat in the 
restaurant. The Court dismissed this issue believing it to have no significance. Principal 
case at 201 n.3. 
23 See Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 61 (1951) in which the Court said, "The 
state's ultimate conclusion on guilt is e.xamined from the due process standpoint in the 
light of facts undisputed by the state." (Emphasis added.) 
24 As a matter of pure speculation, it may be suggested that the Court is requiring 
"substantial evidence" as it does in administrative law cases. This requires that there be 
enough evidence to support the inference of guilt. As defined in NLRB v. Columbian 
Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939), "[Substantial evidence means] ••. 
enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the con-
clusion sought to be drawn from it [the evidence] is one of fact for the jury." 
